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Abstract 
Population ageing is one of the major long-term challenges industrialized countries face. 
Forecasts predict that public debt is going to rise sharply for most countries due to 
population ageing. However, until now there has been little research on how population 
ageing already affects public debt. Based on a panel data analysis for 18 European 
countries it is shown that there is only little empirical evidence for an impact until 2015. 
This does certainly not mean that it will not have an effect on public debt in the future. 
Governments are well-advised to benefit from the breathing space the still moderate total 
dependency ratio offers to adapt their social security systems. 
JEL Classification: E62 Fiscal policy, H63 Debt, debt management, sovereign debt, J11 
Demographic trends, macroeconomic effects, and forecasts 
Keywords: Population ageing, public debt, social security systems, demographic dividend  
1. Introduction 
All industrialized countries are faced with population ageing, albeit to different 
degrees. This overthrow comes from two distinct mechanisms. The first is rising life-
expectancy and the second the declining fertility rate with the latter being the major 
driving force for population ageing (Weil, 2006; Birg, 2015). Though, the industrialized 
countries are still benefitting from a breathing space due to a low total dependency ratio, 
composed of youth and old age dependency ratio (Figure 1, if not indicated otherwise all 
figures show data for the sample employed for the empirical testing). This “demographic 
dividend” is paying because the baby boomers are to a large extent still part of the 
working force and have still not fully retired. Since the end of the baby boom, population 
growth has sharply declined which has decreased the burden of the youth dependency 
ratio but not yet sharply increased the burden of the old-age dependency ratio (Weil, 
1997). 
 
Figure 1 
Once this breathing space is used up, the full effect of population ageing on public 
finances will occur. As most social security systems are designed as pay-as-you-go 
systems, no (sufficient) reserves have been accumulated to face this overthrow. 
Economists vastly agree that as a consequence public debt in most industrialized 
countries is going to rise because these additional expenditures can only be managed to a 
limited extent by additional revenues or reform measures. 
Whereas research on how population ageing is going to affect public debt is extensive, 
little research has been done until now on whether and how it already affects public debt. 
Given the magnitude of demographic change it should expected that it can already be seen 
in the data. Based on a panel data analysis and using different indicators to capture 
population ageing, this article shows, however, that there is little evidence that it has 
already affected public debt. This does not mean that forecasts are wrong, but simply that 
until now the effects on debt cannot be detected. Examples show that population ageing 
might not affect public debt in the future as severely as predicted, especially not if 
adjustment and reform measures are undertaken in time before the voting power of the 
old age people can prevent such adaptions. 
The rest of the article is organized as follows: The literature on the impact of population 
ageing on public debt is reviewed in chapter 2. In chapter 3, the empirical testing and its 
results are presented. Chapter 4 concludes the article. 
2. Literature review 
The literature on the impact of population ageing on public debt can be subdivided into 
two different groups with the one taking an ex-ante view, forecasting the impact of 
population ageing on debt in the future, and the other one taking an ex-post view, 
analysing how it has already affected public debt. Especially the literature of the first 
group is extensive. 
To measure public debt, different methods can be used but generally they rely on debt 
as a ratio relative to economic output (𝑑𝑡 =
𝐷𝑡
𝑌𝑡
). This view is in accordance with 
governments’ view on public debt which takes only past payment flows into account. The 
following formula describes public debt in a given period 𝑡. In this equation 𝐵𝑡 = 𝑇𝑡 −
𝐺𝑡 − 𝑍𝑡  is the annual government balance, including interest payments (𝑍𝑡 = 𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑡−1), 
and 𝑔𝑡 the nominal GDP growth rate. 
𝑑𝑡 =∑
−𝐵𝑡
(1 + 𝑔)𝑇−𝑡
𝑇−1
𝑡=0
+
𝐷0
(1 + 𝑔)𝑇
 
The danger of an increasing debt quota lies in the rising interest payments which result 
from the increasing debt. The increasing interest quota (𝑧𝑡 =
𝑍𝑡
𝐷𝑡
) restricts government’s 
scope and with it chances and possibilities of future generations. This is generally 
considered to be unfair in an intergenerational manner (Schlesinger et al., 1993). That is 
why the debt quota must remain constant over time in order to meet the sustainability 
condition (Blanchard et al., 1990). 
However, this indicator can be highly misleading when dealing with the impact of 
population on public debt (Velculescu, 2010; Auerbach, 2008; Gokhale, 2009; Cecchetti et 
al., 2010) as the debt quota reflects the borrowing history of a country, but does not take 
any future effects into account – not even those effects than can be expected to a high 
probability. Analyses of the future development of public debt take these effects into 
account by calculating today’s sustainability gap (𝐺𝐴𝑃) (Moog and Raffelhüschen, 2014) 
which reflects the sum of the already accumulated, explicit, debt (𝑑𝑡) and the implicit debt 
which will be accumulated in the future. In this equation, 𝑠𝑡 denotes the primary balance 
quota which excludes interest payments (𝑠𝑡 =
𝑇𝑡−𝐺𝑡+𝑖𝑡∗𝐷𝑡−1
𝑌𝑡
) and 𝜋𝑡,𝑖 the annual inflation 
rate. 
𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑡 = 𝑑𝑡 + ∑ (
1 + 𝑔𝑡,𝑖 − 𝜋𝑡,𝑖
1 + 𝑖 − 𝜋𝑡,𝑖
)𝑖−𝑡 ∗ (−𝑠𝑖)
𝑇
𝑖=𝑡+1
 
These equations show that the size of the public debt quota depends on three factors: 
economic growth, interest rates government has to pay on the accumulated debt and 
primary balances. Any calculus of future debt must make assumptions on how these 
variables are going to develop. While demographic projections underlie uncertainty only 
to a narrow degree, projections on these three variables underlie uncertainty to a much 
higher degree. 
Economists vastly agree that future public debt in industrialized countries is going to 
rise due to population ageing especially because public expenditures for pensions and 
even more for health care are going to rise sharply (e. g. Turner et al., 1998; Raffelhüschen, 
2001; Lee and Edwards, 2002; Lee and Tuljapurkar, 2003; Hauner et al., 2007). 
Calculations of Moog and Raffelhüschen (2014) can be taken as example for the 
dimensions of the rise in public debt: They calculate a sustainability gap of 349% for the 
European Union adding an implicit debt of 262% to the explicit debt of 87% (2012). Yet, 
the variation within the European Union is enormous, ranging from a sustainability gap 
of 59% for Lithuania to 1267% for Ireland. 
Because of the projected rise in public debt, economists detect substantial adjustment 
needs of public budgets advocating forward-looking strategies to lower the debt burden 
in a determined manner before the full effects of population ageing become effective 
(Jensen and Nielsen, 1996; Balassone et al., 2008; Cecchetti et al., 2010). This suggestion 
is based on the consideration that with a growing share of old age people, reforms and 
consolidation measures are going to be difficult to implement due to their growing 
political power (Auerbach and Kotlikoff, 1990; Preston, 1984). However, these 
projections cannot be confirmed by all analyses. 
Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1992) find that the higher share of old age people has already 
led to an increase in Social Security benefits in the US since the 1970s. With the share of 
old age people further rising, the probability of falling Social Security benefits is getting 
even lower because of their sheer voting power. 
Razin et al. (2001) develop a theoretical model which solves the puzzle presented by 
their empirical analysis. It shows that a higher dependency ratio of retired people is 
surprisingly negatively correlated with labour tax rates and social transfers. Their model 
solves this contradiction: Pensioners’ claims for higher transfers reduce the incentives to 
work for the working population because of the entailing higher taxes which in turn 
reduces their income. In the equilibrium labour tax rates thereby remain on a moderate 
level. 
Finally, Chen (2004) argues that a growing share of old age people should not only lead 
to higher public expenditures due to higher expenditures for social security but also an 
increase in deficits because of lower per-capita income as a result of lower labour and 
capital inputs. Based on his empirical analysis of developing and developed countries, he 
can confirm this age structure hypothesis only for developing countries, not for developed 
ones. For developed countries he finds no hints for negative bequest motives as developed 
by Cukierman and Meltzer (1989). They had shown theoretically that public debt is 
higher, the lower the share of people for whom labour income is the principal source of 
income because they prefer to increase consumption at the expense of their descendants. 
While the literature forecasting the impact of population ageing sees an increase in 
public debt resulting in redistributional struggles, the question whether these predictions 
will become reality remains open. After all, these forecasts underlie a non-negligible 
degree of uncertainty. 
3. Empirical Testing 
a. Data 
For the empirical testing a panel including the EU15 countries, Norway, Switzerland 
and Iceland from 1981 to 2015 was used. Some observations were arbitrarily missing for 
some states which made it an unbalanced panel. The t-statistics presented in table 4 show 
that the unbalanced panel can be considered representative for the whole sample. An 
overview of the descriptive statistics of the variables employed as well as their origin is 
given in table 5. 
To measure public debt, the public debt quota was employed. In earlier versions of this 
paper, debt per capita and debt relative to the annual public revenue were used as 
dependent variables, too, without showing different results than those for the debt quota. 
Population ageing itself can be measured in different manners and the indicated degree 
of population ageing can vary a lot depending on which indicator is used: 
 the median age of the population (Model 1). Figure 2 shows that there seems to 
be some positive correlation between the median age and public debt, though it 
is not very strong with an R² value of 0.11. 
 
Figure 2 
 the total dependency ratio measuring the share of the population depending on 
the transfers of the rest of the society, in this case the people younger than 15 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
25 30 35 40 45 50
P
u
b
li
c 
d
eb
t 
q
u
o
ta
Median age of the population
Median ages and public debt
and people older than 65 (𝑑𝑒𝑝 =
𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒<15+𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒≥65
𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛15≤𝑎𝑔𝑒<65
) (Model 2). 
Both groups are probable not to work to a large degree, though there might be 
some imperfections because retirement can take place in earlier or also much 
later years, depending on individual circumstances. Figure 3 shows that it 
cannot be argued that there is a close correlation between debt and the total 
dependency ratio (𝑅2 = 0.01). 
 
Figure 3 
 the youth and old age people dependency ratio, both considered separately. The 
youth dependency ratio includes people younger than 15 (𝑦15≤𝑎𝑔𝑒 =
𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒<15
𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛15≤𝑎𝑔𝑒<65
) and the old age people dependency ratio people above age 65 
(𝑒65≤𝑎𝑔𝑒 =
𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒≥65
𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛15≤𝑎𝑔𝑒<65
), both relative to the population at working age 
(Model 3). It is important to consider both groups separately because although 
both groups largely depend on the population at working age they cause costs 
to very different degrees (Weil, 1997): Cutler et al. (1990) calculate that people 
under 20 have 0.72 the consumption need of a working-age adult, people over 
65 1.27 times those needs. Two identical total dependency ratios can thereby 
cause different costs depending on how they are composed. Figure 3 shows that 
contrary to the total dependency ratio there is a close correlation between the 
old age dependency ratio and public debt (𝑅2 = 0.20). At first sight, this 
supports the hypothesis that population ageing affects public debt. For the 
youth dependency ratio there is a very weak negative correlation (𝑅2 = 0.02). 
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 Figure 4 
 two different old age people dependency ratios which divide the total old age 
dependency ratio at the age of 85 (𝑒65≤𝑎𝑔𝑒<85 =
𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛65≤𝑎𝑔𝑒<85
𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛15≤𝑎𝑔𝑒<65
 and 𝑒85≤𝑎𝑔𝑒 =
𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒≥85
𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛15≤𝑎𝑔𝑒<65
) (Model 4). Costs rise disproportionally at higher ages 
because contrary to common assumptions, rising life expectancy does not 
prolong years in good health, but stretches life expectancy albeit sickness (Birg, 
2015). Increasing life expectancy thereby causes high costs (if pension ages 
remain constant) because of higher pension payments and to a higher degree 
because of higher health care costs (Lee and Tuljapurkar, 2003). This problem 
will become even more severe as not only the share of older people will grow 
but also the share of very old age people within the group of old age people. 
Raffelhüschen (2001) describes this process as “double-ag(e)ing” process. 
Figure 5 shows that while the correlation between the old age dependency ratio 
and public debt is weaker for the younger group than for the total old age 
dependency ratio (𝑅2 = 0.14), it is even stronger for the group above age 85 
(𝑅2 = 0.26). 
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 Figure 5 
Besides these demographic variables, political and economic covariates were 
employed which are supposed or which have been shown to have an impact on public 
debt. First, four macroeconomic indicators: national GDP, income per head (in purchasing 
power parities), unemployment and the investment quota. The size of national GDP could 
have a debt-fostering effect because bond markets are bigger and thereby more efficient 
which would result in lower interest rates. This in turn would facilitate public borrowing 
according to the market discipline hypothesis. The income per head might have a debt-
fostering effect because fertility rates are declining before all because of rising income 
(Birg, 2015) which would result in stronger increases in the old age dependency ratio 
which in turn would affect public debt. An economy’s unemployment rate can be expected 
to have a clear negative impact on debt. Unemployment itself can have different reasons: 
rigidities, high minimum wages, high unemployment benefits and others. Yet, it is clear 
that a detrimental development on labour markets leads to a deterioration of public 
finances on the expenditure and revenue side. Finally, economic growth and the 
investment quota should have a debt lowering effect as economic growth has a positive 
impact on public budgets and also increases the denominator of the debt quota and 
economic growth itself is strengthened when investments are high. 
Two indicators of the Freedom House index were included, too. The reasoning was that 
they should have both a debt lowering effect because of the positive effects of a higher 
degree of freedom and political participation on growth and public debt (Gwartney et al., 
1999; De Haan and Sturm, 2000; Kiwiet and Szakaly, 1996; Feld, 1997). 
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b. Testing strategy 
The dependent variable, the public debt quota, is difficult to explain statistically 
because it reflects the entire borrowing history of a country which can data back 
centuries. A country can have borrowed in the past for many different reasons: economic 
downturns, voters’ preferences, banking crises, catastrophes, wars, revolutions, political 
ideology etc. Attempts to explain the size of public debt would have to take all these 
factors into account. Hence, it is much more common to focus on annual flow sizes like the 
budget or primary balance quota. 
The drawback when focussing on budget or primary balances is that this approach 
does not consider all factors which have or might have an influence on the development 
of public debt due to population ageing. It has been shown above that the change of the 
debt quota depends on the interest rate government has to pay on its accumulated debt, 
the growth rate, the size of public debt and the state’s primary balance. When focusing on 
budget balances at least two of these factors are left out from the consideration. However, 
population ageing might have an impact on all factors: interest (e. g. Turner et al., 1998; 
Baldacci and Kumar, 2010; Cecchetti et al., 2010) and growth rates (e. g. Auerbach and 
Kotlikoff 1987 and 1992; Bloom and Williamson, 1998; Turner et al., 1998; Fougère and 
Mérette, 1999; Miles, 1999) and budget balances (Hauner et al., 2007; Chen, 2004). 
Focusing directly on public debt instead of annual balances has one more advantage: It 
has been shown that governments can use methods of creative accounting to lower official 
deficits (which are given more attention to) by using stock-flow adjustments which can 
still be seen in the debt quota (Hagen and Wolff, 2006). 
An empirical strategy which simply regresses the public debt quota on demographic 
variables could find a correlation as it has been shown above and yet, this could simply be 
due to the fact that both variables show a common upwards trend resulting in a spurious 
regression (Figure 6). When using the change in debt as a dependent variable instead of 
budget balances this problem can be addressed. If population ageing affects public debt 
negatively, a higher old age dependency ratio is positively correlated with a change in 
debt. This way, the general influence of population ageing is captured, though the channel 
through which population ageing affects public debt (higher public spending, lower public 
revenue, increase in interest rates or a decrease in growth rates) must be left to further 
research. 
 Figure 6 
c. Model specification 
For the empirical testing two different estimations are presented: a simple OLS 
regression and one including individual (country) and time (year) fixed effects (two-
ways). The OLS regression is formulated as follows: 
𝛥𝑑𝑖, 𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖, 𝑡 
In the equation above, 𝛥𝑑𝑖, 𝑡 denotes the change in the dependent debt variable, 𝑋𝑖,𝑡  is 
a vector containing the covariates, 𝑒𝑖,𝑡  is a vector with the demographic variables and 𝜀𝑖, 𝑡 
is the error term. 
The two-ways fixed effects regression then takes the individual (𝛼𝑖) and time-specific 
(𝛼𝑡) effects into account: 
𝛥𝑑𝑖, 𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖, 𝑡 
All models contain a lag of the debt variable itself (𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1 ). As explained above, the 
change of the debt quota in a period 𝑡 depends on the size of the debt quota in the previous 
period 𝑡 − 1 because past debt accumulation entails interest payments which influence 
changes in debt in following periods. 
d. Empirical results 
The regression results are presented in table 1. In all regressions lagged debt shows a 
very strong correlation. Lagged public debt contributes indeed substantially to explain 
the change of public debt in period 𝑡. The negative algebraic sign leads to the conclusion 
that a higher size in public debt entails lower increases in future periods. This can be 
interpreted as a reaction of governments being afraid to lose confidence of investors after 
stronger increases of debt in the past and hence trying to limit their borrowing. 
The macroeconomic variables show different results. The size of GDP is significantly 
negatively correlated with the change in debt in the pooled regressions. When controlling 
for time and individual fixed effects the algebraic sign becomes positive. It is thereby not 
robust to the testing method, although it is significant. The hypothesis presented above 
that countries with bigger bond markets might face less disciplining of markets may 
thereby still be true. The GDP per head, though, is always significantly negatively 
correlated with the change in debt. Richer countries thereby seem to limit their 
borrowing, contrary to the hypothesis formulated above. This can however be explained 
with the fact that the full effects of population ageing have not yet fully set in as it will be 
shown. For unemployment, growth and investment quota, the results are as expected: 
Unemployment has a significant debt-fostering, higher growth rates and investment 
quotas a significant debt-lowering effect which is in line with the hypotheses presented 
above. 
The institutional variables included have, except for one case (pooled regression for 
model 1), the expected negative algebraic sign. Thus, a higher degree of political and 
economic freedom seems indeed to have some debt lowering effect, yet only the variable 
for the civil liberties is significant in some cases. The missing significance for the political 
rights variable can be explained with the small variance and the homogeneity of the 
countries included in the panel. 
Concerning the demographic variables, the results are as follows: 
 The median age shows a debt-fostering, yet not significant, effect when 
controlling for time and individual fixed effects. 
 A higher total dependency ratio shows a significant debt-lowering effect. 
 The same is true for the old age dependency ratio when estimating the pooled 
model. But significance disappears when controlling for time and individual 
fixed effects. The algebraic sign switches then, too. 
DeltaPubDebt 
 Pooled (1) 
Twoways fixed 
effects (1) 
Pooled (2) 
Twoways fixed 
effects (2) 
Pooled (3) 
Twoways fixed 
effects (3) 
Pooled (4) 
Twoways fixed 
effects (4) 
Intercept 22.46 (5.43)***  35.47 (6.62)***  33.24 (6.84)***  38.65 (9.69)***  
Lag (-1) PubDebt -0.03 (0.01)*** -0.09 (0.01)*** -0.03 (0.01)*** -0.09 (0.01)*** -0.03 (0.01)*** -0.11 (0.02)*** -0.03 (0.01)*** -0.11 (-7.43)*** 
GDP (log) -0.44 (0.15)** 18.43 (6.65)** -0.35 (0.15)* 12.65 (6.39)* -0.28 (0.16). 20.30 (7.28)** -0.35 (0.18)* 29.41 (7.87)*** 
GDPHead (log, PPP) -0.85 (0.56) -15.85 (8.62). -1.57 (0.44)*** -12.82 (8.12) -1.32 (0.48)** -21.19 (8.97)* -1.74 (0.72)* -29.58 (9.35)** 
Unemploy 0.20 (0.05)*** 0.42 (0.10)*** 0.21 (0.05)*** 0.46 (0.10)*** 0.21 (0.05)*** 0.46 (0.10)*** 0.21 (0.05)*** 0.43 (0.10) 
Growth -1.16 (0.08)*** -0.69 (0.10)*** -1.12 (0.07)*** -0.70 (0.10)*** -1.15 (0.08)*** -0.70 (0.10)*** -1.14 (0.08)*** -0.64 (0.10)*** 
Invest -0.11 (0.06). -0.35 (0.09)*** -0.15 (0.06)* -0.35 (0.09)* -0.14 (0.06)* -0.35 (0.09)*** -0.14 (0.06)* -0.42 (0.09)*** 
CivLib 0.07 (0.43) -1.14 (0.57)* -0.20 (0.43) -1.26 (0.55)* -0.16 (0.43) -1.26 (0.55)* -0.17 (0.43) -1.03 (0.55). 
PolRight -1.80 (1.11) -1.28 (1.11) -1.56 (1.11) -1.45 (1.10) -1.51 (1.11) -1.45 (1.10) -1.61 (1.12) -1.22 (1.10) 
MedianAge -0.07 (0.08) 0.17 (0.25)       
TotDepRatio   -0.16 (0.05)** -0.23 (0.09)**     
OldAgeRatio (≥ 65)     -0.23 (0.08)** 0.04 (0.15)   
OldAgeRatio (64 < 
age < 85) 
      -0.29 (0.11) -0.04 (0.15) 
OldAgeRatio (≥ 85)       0.24 (0.59) 2.70 (0.93)** 
YouthRatio (< 15)     -0.14 (0.05)** -0.29 (0.08)*** -0.15 (0.06)** -0.28 (0.08)*** 
N 613 613 612 612 612 612 612 612 
R² 0.35 0.22 0.35 0.23 0.36 0.24 0.36 0.24 
Standard errors in parentheses; ‘.’: 10% significance level, ‘*’: 5%, ‘**’: 1%, ‘***’: 0.1% 
Table 1
 When splitting the old age dependency ratio into two groups (old age 
dependency ratios 65 ≤ age < 85 and 85 ≤ age), the algebraic sign for the 
younger group is again negative but not significant. For the older group the 
algebraic sign is negative in both cases and significant when controlling for time 
and individual fixed effects. 
 A higher youth ratio always has a significant debt-lowering effect. 
e. Model diagnostics 
For the model analysis the pooled models were compared to models with fixed effects. 
The F-tests clearly reject the null in all cases. The individual-specific heterogeneity should 
thereby be taken into account. 
F-test for individual fixed 
effects 
Model 1 
F = 2.65 
p = 0.00 
Model 2 
F = 2.66 
p = 0.00 
Model 3 
F = 2.63 
p = 0.00 
Model 4 
F = 2.64 
p = 0.00 
Table 2 
F-tests comparing the models with individual fixed effects with models with individual 
and time fixed effects also clearly reject the null for all four models. Time fixed effects 
should thereby also be taken into account. 
F test for twoways fixed effects 
Model 1 
F = 4.18 
p = 0.00 
Model 2 
F = 4.24 
p = 0.00 
Model 3 
F = 4.50 
p = 0.00 
Model 4 
F = 5.00 
p = 0.00 
Table 3 
f. Discussion of the empirical results 
The empirical results presented above do not show clear evidence for an impact of 
population ageing on public debt until 2015 for the included countries. Some evidence can 
be found for the influence of the old age dependency ratio for people above age 85 but 
otherwise it is difficult to argue that population ageing has already affected public debt. 
Governments seem to have been able to manage the rising old age dependency ratios 
without relying on an increase of public debt. The results are in line with the findings of 
Razin et al. (2001) and Chen (2004). It should be noticed, however, that these results do 
certainly not imply that population ageing will not have an effect on debt, they only show 
that until 2015 it does not seem to have had an effect. 
These results are less surprising than they first might look. Raffelhüschen (2001) 
predicts that the breathing space resulting from the low total dependency ratio (Figure 1) 
would last until 2015. He then expects a strongly rising old age dependency ratio putting 
pressure on public finances. It can thereby be argued that the demographic dividend is 
still paying but it is far from certain that this will still be valid in the years to come. 
However, one fact should not be forgotten: Liabilities to future pensioners are political 
promises which can be adapted at any time. Several countries have addressed reforms of 
their social security systems by raising pensioning ages or cutting transfers (at least in 
nominal terms), thereby lowering real effects of future liabilities. Two countries shall be 
considered here more precisely: Italy and Germany. Both countries are among the fastest 
ageing in the world. Italy had an old age dependency ratio of 33.7% in 2015 and Germany 
of 32.0%. The European Union as a whole will reach a comparable dependency ratio only 
after 2020. Some countries, like Ireland, Cyprus, Luxemburg or Norway are forecasted to 
exceed these values only after 2030. Despite the fast ageing of their societies, both 
countries show very low implicit debt in comparison to the other European countries. In 
addition, Germany shows a moderate and declining debt quota. The high primary 
surpluses albeit already high pension payments in both countries contribute substantially 
to their low sustainability gaps (Moog and Raffelhüschen, 2014). Furthermore, their low 
implicit debt is a result of reforms in the past. Both countries have raised their pensioning 
ages, Germany has adapted its pensioning system by introducing a demographic factor 
which links pension payments to the old age dependency ratio and it has created 
incentives for more private provision. Due to the rising political power of the old age 
population in the upcoming decades (Figure 7) it was important to undertake these 
reforms in time. 
 
Figure 7 
4. Conclusions 
The empirical analysis of this article has shown that there is only limited evidence that 
population ageing has already affected public budgets to such an extent that it results in 
higher public debt. This result is in line with the literature taking an ex-post view on the 
subject. However, this analysis still points out need for further research. First, the 
question remains open whether population ageing affects only public primary balances 
or if it also affects interest and growth rates. Second, it covers the Western European 
economies but the Non-European economies and the Eastern European economies which 
lay behind the iron curtain until 1990 are not taken into consideration. Further analyses 
should extend their scope to these countries. 
What policy implications can be drawn from these results? The results do not put the 
consensus into question that population ageing is going to affect public debt in the future. 
The need for solutions for this problem remains. However, enforced immigration can not 
be seen as a solution. The German example illustrates  this: To keep the share of people 
above age 65 constant, 188 million additional people would have to migrate to Germany 
until 2050. This would lead to a rise of the total population from 82 to 299 million. 
Enforced immigration would thereby very probably lead to other severe problems, e. g. 
concerning integration (Birg, 2015). Governments should instead benefit from the 
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opportunity that the breathing space offers them and adapt their social security systems 
in time before the voting power of the old age people becomes fully effective. Possible 
measures are increases in the pensioning age, an adaption of pension payments, 
accompanied by the creation of incentives for private capital accumulation. 
5. Annex 
Two sample t-test 
Variables t-test 
PubDebt t = 0.05 
p = 0.96 
GDP t = 0.05 
p = 0.85 
IncHead t = -0.34 
p = 0.74 
Unemploy t = -0.38 
p =0.71 
Growth t = -0.06 
p =0.96 
Inv t = 0.45 
p =0.65 
CivilLib t = -0.22 
p = 0.83 
PolRight t = -0.09 
p = 0.93 
MedianAge t = -0.83 
p = 0.41 
TotDepRatio t = 0.67 
p = 0.50 
OldAgeRatio (age ≥ 65) t = -0.53 
p = 0.60 
OldAgeRatio (65 ≤ age < 84) t = -0.52 
p =0.60 
OldAgeRatio (age ≥ 85) t = -0.45 
p =0.65 
YouthRatio (age < 15) t = 0.96 
p = 0.34 
Table 4 
Descriptive statistics 
Variable Source Description Obs. Min. Med. Mean Max. 
Public debt quota IMF, Eurostat PubDebt 642 4.7 54.7 59.9 179.7 
GDP IMF GDP 648 11.3 615.5 951.3 4078.6 
GDP per head (PPP) IMF, own calculations IncHead 648 6764.0 26516.0 29408.0 98987.0 
Unemployment IMF Unemploy 644 0.2 7.0 7.4 27.5 
Investment quota IMF Inv 648 9.8 22.6 22.8 38.3 
Civil liberties Freedom House CivLib 648 1.0 1.0 1.3 3.0 
Political rights Freedom House PolRight 648 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 
Median age Eurostat MedianAge 646 26.5 37.3 37.1 45.9 
Total dependency ratio Eurostat TotDepRatio 645 42.7 50.3 50.8 69.7 
Old age dependency ratio (age ≥ 65) Eurostat OldAgeRatio 645 15.6 22.7 22.9 33.7 
Old age dependency ratio (65 ≤ age < 85) Eurostat, own calculations OldAgeRatio 645 15.6 20.3 20.5 28.8 
Old age dependency ratio (age ≥ 85) Eurostat, own calculations OldAgeRatio 645 0.9 2.3 2.4 4.9 
Youth dependency ratio (age < 15) Eurostat YouthRatio 646 20.0 27.2 28.0 51.5 
Table 5 
6. References 
Auerbach, Alan J. and Laurence J. Kotlikoff (1987): Dynamic Fiscal Policy. Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, UK. 
Auerbach, Alan J. and Laurence J. Kotlikoff (1990): Demographics, Fiscal Policy, and U. S: 
Saving in the 1980s and Beyond. NBER Working Paper 3150. 
Auerbach, Alan J. and Laurence J. Kotlikoff (1992): The Impact of Demographic Transition 
on Capital Formation. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics 94(2), pp. 281-295. 
Auerbach, Alan J. (2008): Long-Term Objectives for Government Debt. Paper presented at 
a conference on Fiscal Policy and Labour Market Reforms, organized by the Swedish 
Fiscal Policy Council, Stockholm. 
Balassone, Fabrizio, Jorge Cunha, Geert Langenus Bernhard Manzke, Jeanne Pavot,  Doris 
Prammer and Pietro Tommasino (2008): Fiscal Sustainability and Policy 
Implications for the Euro Area. Notes d’études et de recherche 225. 
Baldacci, Emanuele and Manmohan Kumar (2010): Fiscal Deficits, Public Debt and 
Sovereign Bond Yields. IMF Working Paper 10/184.  
Birg, Herwig (2015): Die alternde Republik und das Versagen der Politik: Eine 
demographische Prognose. Münster. 
Blanchard, Olivier, Jean-Claude Chouraqui, Robert P. Hagemann and Nicola Sartor (1990): 
The Sustainability of Fiscal Policy: New Answers to an Old Question. OECD Economic 
Studies No. 15, pp. 7-36. 
Bloom, David E. and Jeffrey G. Williamson (1998): Demographic Transitions and 
Economic Miracles in Emerging Asia. The World Bank Economic Review 12(3), pp. 
419-455. 
Cecchetti, Stephen G., Madhusudan Mohanty and Fabrizio Zampolli (2010): The Future of 
Public Debt: Prospects and Implications. BIS Working Papers No. 300. 
Chen, Derek H. C. (2004): Population Age Structure and the Budget Deficit.  Journal for 
Insurance and Financial Management 1(4), pp. 32-67. 
Cukierman, Alex and Allan H. Meltzer (1989): A Political Theory of Government Debt and 
Deficits in a Neo-Ricardian Framework. American Economic Review 79(4), pp. 713-
732. 
Cutler, David M., James M. Poterba, Louise M. Shreiner, Lawrence H. Summers and George 
A. Akerlof (1990): An aging society: opportunity or challenge? Brookings Papers on 
Economic Activity 1, pp. 1-73. 
De Haan, Jakob and Jan-Egbert Sturm (2000): On the relationship between economic 
freedom and economic growth. European Journal of Political Economy 16(2000), pp. 
215-241. 
Feld, Lars P. (1997): Ordnungsethische Erkenntnisse und Politikverhalten. Auferheide, 
Detlef and Martin Dobrowski (ed.): Wirtschaftsethik und Moralökonomik, pp. 299-
310, Berlin. 
Fougère, Maxime and Marcel Mérette (1999): Population ageing and economic growth in 
seven OECD countries. Economic Modelling 16(1999), pp. 411-427. 
Gokhale, Jagadeesh (2009): Measuring the Unfunded Obligations of European Countries. 
National Center for Policy Analysis, Policy Report No. 319. 
Gwartney, James D., Robert A. Lawson and Randall G. Holcombe (1999): Economic 
Freedom and the Environment for Economic Growth. Journal for Institutional and 
Theoretical Economics 155(4), pp. 643-663. 
Hagen, Jürgen von and Guntram B. Wolff (2006): What do deficits tell us about debt? 
Empirical evidence on creative accounting with fiscal rules in the EU. Journal of 
Banking and Finance 30(2006), pp. 3259-3279. 
Hauner, David, Daniel Leigh and Michael Skaarup (2007): Ensuring Fiscal Sustainability 
in G-7 Countries. IMF Working Paper 07/187. 
Jensen, Svend E. H. and Søren Bo Nielsen (1996): Population Ageing, Public Debt and 
Sustainable Fiscal Policy. Fiscal Studies 16(2), pp. 1-20. 
Kiwiet, D. Roderick and Kristin Szakaly (1996): Constitutional Limitations on Borrowing: 
An Analysis of State Bonded Indebtedness. Journal of Law, Economics and 
Organization 12(1), pp. 62-97. 
Lee, Ronald and Ryan Edwards (2002): The Fiscal Effects of Population Aging in the U.S.: 
Assessing the Uncertainties. Poterba, James M.  (ed.): Tax Policy and the Economy, 
Vol. 16, pp. 141-180. 
Lee, Ronald and Shripad Tuljapurkar (1998): Uncertain Demographic Futures and Social 
Security Finances. The American Economic Review 88(2), pp. 237-241. 
Miles, David (1999): Modelling the impact of demographic change upon the economy. The 
Economic Journal 109(452), pp. 1-36. 
Moog, Stephan and Bernd Raffelhüschen (2014): Ehrbare Staaten? Update 2013: Die 
Nachhaltigkeit der öffentlichen Finanzen in Europa. Argumente zu Marktwirtschaft 
und Politik Nr. 125, Mai 2014. 
Preston, Samuel H. (1984): Children and the elderly: divergent paths for America’s 
dependents. Demography 21(4), pp. 435-457. 
Raffelhüschen, Bernd (2001): Aging, Fiscal Policy, and Social Insurance: A European 
Perspective. Auerbach, Alan J. and Ronald D. Lee (ed.): Demographic Change and 
Fiscal Policy, pp. 202-241. Cambridge. 
Razin, Assaf, Efraim Sadka and Phillip Swagel (2001): The Aging Population and the Size 
of the Welfare State. NBER Working Paper Series 8405. 
Ricardo, David (1962): The principles of political economy and taxation. Sraffa, Pierro 
(ed.): The works and correspondence of David Ricardo, Vol. I. Cambridge. 
Schlesinger, Helmut, Manfred Weber and Gerhard Ziebarth (1993): Staatsverschuldung– 
ohne Ende? Darmstadt. 
Turner, Dave, Claude Giorno, Alain De Serres, Ann Vourc’h and Pete Richardson (1998): 
The Macroeconomic Implications of Ageing in a Global Context. OECD Economic 
Department Working Papers No. 193. 
Velculescu, Delia (2010): Some Uncomfortable Arithmetic Regarding Europe’s Public 
Finances. IMF Working Paper 10/177. 
Weil, David N. (1997): The Economics of Population Aging. Rosenzweig, Mark and Oded 
Stark (ed.): Handbook of Population and Family Economics. North-Holland, pp. 967-
1014. 
Weil, David N. (2006): Population Aging. NBER Working Paper 12147. 
